How fast is AI?
Menu

Live tracker · data updated Oct 19, 2026

AI moves by the month. The economy moves by the year.

Two clocks, side by side. The fast one tracks what AI can do and what it costs, synced daily. The slow one tracks productivity and jobs in eight economies. The gap between them is the story, and the weak-link view of growth explains it.

Come back any time

This page remembers when you last visited (in your browser only) and shows what changed: new models, capability records, price drops, and new labor data.

Latest: Meta AI released Muse Spark OpenOct 15, 2026

The fast clock · global

650× cheaper

GPT-4-level intelligence cost $37.50 per million tokens in Mar 2023. Today 135 models from 14 labs match it, 55 of them open-weight, from $0.058. See every level

Capability frontier (ECI)
166.8
Claude Opus 5.5, Anthropic · up from 150.7 a year earlier
Longest task done half the time
17h
Claude Mythos Preview (provisional, above METR's 16-hour limit) · 1740× longer than at ChatGPT's launch
When could it do yours?
Open-weight lag
5.3 months
Kimi K3 (Moonshot) matched GPT-5.3 Codex
Releases in the last 90 days
41
28 independently scored so far

Source: Capability: Epoch Capabilities Index. Prices: providers' list prices, blended 3:1 input to output, per token. Task horizons: METR. · Epoch Capabilities Index (ECI) · Data on AI models · LiteLLM model price map · Task-completion time horizons (Time Horizon 1.1)

The slow clock · by country

OECD average

Output per worker, year on year
+1.4%
2025 · 0.9% a year over the last decade
Output per worker since ChatGPT
+2.3%
2022 to 2025, in total
Unemployment
5%
Apr 2026, up 0.1 pt since Nov 2022 (was 4.9%)
Youth unemployment, ages 15–24
11.4%
Apr 2026, up 0.8 pt since Nov 2022 (was 10.6%)

Context, not cause: unemployment moves with interest rates and the business cycle, and productivity with everything else. Output per hour comes from the BLS (US, quarterly); output per worker from the World Bank (annual, comparable across countries).

Source: Unemployment: BLS (US), OECD harmonised rates, Eurostat (EU). Productivity: BLS output per hour (US) and World Bank output per worker. · US Bureau of Labor Statistics · OECD Data Explorer · Eurostat · World Development Indicators

Why the clocks run at different speeds

Since ChatGPT launched (Nov 2022), the price of GPT-4-level intelligence has fallen 650× and the length of task a frontier model can finish has grown 1740×. Over the same stretch, US output per hour rose 9.1% in total. Cheap inputs do not finish the job: work is a chain of tasks, and output waits on the links still held by people, such as judgment, accountability, trust, and physical presence.

Read the explainer

From capability to value

Two routes to impact.

The gap between the clocks is not just a matter of waiting. It also depends on the applications we build: do they take over existing tasks, help people do better work, or both?

Automate an existing task

Reduce the human effort needed for an activity. But producing a draft is not the same as delivering an accepted result: review, exceptions, and accountability still count.

Illustrative example: extract fields from invoices, with people handling unusual cases and checking errors.

Measure: total time and cost per accepted result, including rework.

Expand what people can do

Help a person make better decisions, serve more people, or offer something that was previously impractical. Value can come from better output, not just fewer hours.

Illustrative example: help a support agent find relevant information while the agent handles the customer and decides what to do.

Measure: quality, capacity, and who benefits, as well as time saved.

These routes overlap within a job. Neither an automation label nor an augmentation label tells us whether employment or wages will rise or fall; demand, adoption, and how the gains are shared matter too. The mechanisms apply across countries, but outcomes need local evidence.

Cheaper intelligence is not cheaper delivery.

Our price comparison holds benchmark performance roughly fixed. It does not measure the full cost of a workflow: integration, verification, rework, and human responsibility remain. Faster models are inputs; useful applications turn them into outcomes.

Source: An interpretation of the automation/complementarity distinction, not a replacement forecast. Acemoglu argues for a more worker-complementing direction; this is a perspective, not a settled outcome. · Acemoglu, Humanist Review · The Simple Macroeconomics of AI