The library
The research behind the tracker.
The claims here trace back to published work, and where a number is an estimate, digitization, or projection, the page says so. The core weak-link framing, forecast model, computer-share figure, 150-year growth frame, infinite-automation result, and self-driving example draw directly on the work of Charles I. Jones and Jones & Tonetti, while Daron Acemoglu's estimates anchor the skeptical end. Alongside them sits a wider, recent literature on how fast AI is actually moving: capability and compute trends, broader growth models, and field studies of productivity.
Economic growth
- Charles I. Jonesin prep.A.I. and Our Economic Future
Working paper, in prep. for the Journal of Economic Perspectives
Direct non-technical source for the infinite-automation 1/(1-s) result, the self-driving-cars example, and the weak-link view of AI growth.
- Charles I. Jones2026"A.I. and Our Economic Future," Professor Chad Jones
Stanford Graduate School of Business (YouTube)
Stanford GSB talk presenting the weak-link growth view and figures adapted on this page, including the computer-share and forecast charts.
- Paul M. Romer1990Endogenous Technological Change
Journal of Political Economy 98(5): S71–S102
Ideas as the engine of long-run growth (Nobel 2018). The flywheel that 'wants to explode'.
- Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen & Webb2020Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find?
American Economic Review 110(4): 1104–1144
Within any technology, ideas get harder to find (the steam engine runs out of steam), so each wave buys ~50 years of 2% growth.
- Aghion, Jones & Jones2019Artificial Intelligence and Economic Growth
in The Economics of Artificial Intelligence, Univ. of Chicago Press (NBER WP 23928)
The earlier automation + weak-links growth model behind the baseline forecast scenarios.
- Daron Acemoglu2024The Simple Macroeconomics of AI
Economic Policy 40(121): 13–58 (NBER WP 32487)
The conservative end of the dial: predicted TFP gains below 0.53% over 10 years, with the initial task-based estimate no more than 0.66%.
- Philip Trammell & Anton Korinek2023Economic Growth under Transformative AI
NBER Working Paper 31815
A survey synthesizing the AI-and-growth literature: fully automating production can break the Kaldor facts, raise the growth rate, and lower the labor share. The wider map the weak-link view sits inside.
- Ege Erdil & Tamay Besiroglu2023Explosive Growth from AI Automation: A Review of the Arguments
arXiv:2309.11690
The case that broad automation could accelerate growth by roughly tenfold, weighed against nine counterarguments. The most rigorous steelman for the fast end of the dial.
Weak links & fragility
- Charles I. Jones2011Intermediate Goods and Weak Links in the Theory of Economic Development
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3(2): 1–28
The origin of the weak-link metaphor: a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.
- Charles I. Jones & Christopher Tonetti2026Past Automation and Future A.I.: How Weak Links Tame the Growth Explosion
Working paper, Stanford University
Direct source for the automation-meets-weak-links forecast model, the computer-share chart, and the decades-to-mature-then-acceleration result.
- Michael Kremer1993The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3): 551–575
Production as a chain of tasks where one failure destroys most of the value, the fragility behind the 'fast downside'.
Measuring AI's pace
- Kwa, West, Becker et al. (METR)2025Measuring AI Ability to Complete Long Tasks
METR; arXiv:2503.14499
The length of task an AI agent can finish with 50% reliability roughly doubled every 7 months in the original paper; METR's current dashboard estimates about 6.2 months all-time. A direct, empirical answer to 'how fast,' independent of the growth model.
- Sevilla, Besiroglu, Cottier, You et al. (Epoch AI)2024Can AI Scaling Continue Through 2030?
Epoch AI
Training compute has grown about 4x per year; power, chips, data, and latency still leave room for runs roughly 10,000x larger by 2030. The cheap input keeps getting cheaper; that is exactly why it is not the scarce one.
- Luke Emberson & David Roodman (Epoch AI)2026The Plunging Price of Thought
Epoch AI (September 2026)
Across five math, science, and puzzle benchmarks since 2023, the per-question inference cost of achieving a given performance level (counting reasoning tokens) fell about 47% per quarter, or 13x per year, fastest right after a level debuts (75x/year) and slowing to 4.7x/year two years later.
- Maslej et al. (Stanford HAI)2025The 2025 AI Index Report
Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI
Benchmark scores jumped in a single year (GPQA +48.9 points), training compute doubles about every five months, and the inference cost of GPT-3.5-level output fell roughly 280x in two years.
- Handa, Tamkin, McCain, Huang, Durmus et al. (Anthropic)2025Which Economic Tasks are Performed with AI? Evidence from Millions of Claude Conversations
Anthropic Economic Index; arXiv:2503.04761
Claude.ai conversations mapped onto O*NET tasks show current usage led by computer/mathematical work and writing/editing tasks, with explicit augmentation-vs-automation splits. A live read on which links are actually moving.
Labor & distribution
- Daron Acemoglu2026Will AI Replace Workers? Not If We Build It Right.
The Humanist Review of AI, Issue 1 (essay)
An editorial argument for applications that complement workers rather than only mimic them. Links capability to application design and adoption; its US forecasts are estimates, not observed job losses or global outcomes.
- Karabarbounis & Neiman2014The Global Decline of the Labor Share
Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(1): 61–103
Context for the capital-vs-labor split that the scenarios track to 100% / 0%.
- Brynjolfsson, Rock & Syverson2021The Productivity J-Curve
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 13(1): 333–372
Why measured productivity lags transformative tech: adoption races up the S-curve while output sits in the J-curve trough.
- Becker, Rush, Barnes & Rein (METR)2025Measuring the Impact of Early-2025 AI on Experienced Open-Source Developer Productivity
arXiv:2507.09089 (randomized experiment)
16 experienced developers completed 246 tasks in familiar open-source repositories. With early-2025 AI tools they took 19% longer. A result about those tools, developers, and tasks, not a general verdict on coding assistance or later models.
- Agarwal, Moehring, Rajpurkar & Salz2023Combining Human Expertise with Artificial Intelligence: Experimental Evidence from Radiology
NBER Working Paper 31422
An experiment on how radiologists combine AI predictions with contextual information. Human-plus-AI performance depends on how the information is used; complementarity is a design problem, not an automatic consequence of access to a model.
- Brynjolfsson, Li & Raymond2025Generative AI at Work
Quarterly Journal of Economics (2025); NBER WP 31161
A field study of 5,179 support agents: AI raised issues resolved per hour 14% on average and 34% for novices, with little effect on experts. The gains land first where skill was scarce.
- Shakked Noy & Whitney Zhang2023Experimental Evidence on the Productivity Effects of Generative AI
Science 381(6654): 187–192
In a writing experiment, ChatGPT cut time 40% and raised quality 18%, narrowing the gap between weaker and stronger writers. Task-level speed-ups are real even where measured GDP is slow to move.
- Dell'Acqua, McFowland, Mollick, Lifshitz-Assaf, Kellogg et al.2023Navigating the Jagged Technological Frontier: Field Experimental Evidence of the Effects of AI on Knowledge Worker Productivity and Quality
Harvard Business School Working Paper 24-013
In a randomized experiment with 758 BCG consultants, AI raised task speed by 25% and quality by 40% inside its capability boundary, but reduced accuracy by 19 percentage points on a task designed just outside it. Shows why human verification remains a critical link.
- Alexander Bick, Adam Blandin & David J. Deming2026The Rapid Adoption of Generative AI
Management Science 72(10): 8440–8456 (NBER WP 32966)
Nationally representative US surveys find workplace adoption of generative AI outpaced the personal computer and internet at comparable stages after launch, assisting 1–5% of work hours with self-reported time savings equivalent to 1.4% of total hours.
- Anders Humlum & Emilie Vestergaard2025Large Language Models, Small Labor Market Effects
NBER Working Paper 33777
Links adoption surveys of 25,000 workers and 7,000 workplaces across 11 exposed occupations to administrative labor records in Denmark. Finds widespread adoption and ~3% average time savings, but precise null effects on earnings and recorded work hours two years on.
- Erik Brynjolfsson, Bharat Chandar & Ruyu Chen2025Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of AI
Stanford Digital Economy Lab
Using ADP payroll records, early-career workers (ages 22–25) in the most AI-exposed US occupations saw about a 13% relative decline in employment since late 2022, while older workers in the same occupations held steady.
- McElheran, Yang, Brynjolfsson & Kroff2026The Adoption of Industrial AI in America
AEA Papers and Proceedings 116: 20–25
US Census firm-level evidence on industrial AI adoption: early adopters tend to be larger, younger, multi-unit firms investing in complementary organizational practices, consistent with a firm-level productivity J-curve.
Risk & the fast-takeoff case
- Dario Amodei2024Machines of Loving Grace
Essay (darioamodei.com)
The optimistic 'country of geniuses in a datacenter' vision, useful context for the aggressive side of the forecast debate.
Organizational change
- Van de Ven & Poole1995Explaining Development and Change in Organizations
Academy of Management Review 20(3): 510–540
Four motors of change (life-cycle, teleology, dialectics, evolution), the org-level analog of 'what kind of change are you in?'
- Tsoukas & Chia2002On Organizational Becoming
Organization Science 13(5): 567–582
Change as the normal condition of organizing, grounds the claim that diffusion is continuous and slow.
- Karl E. Weick1995Sensemaking in Organizations
Sage Publications
How people construct meaning from ambiguous change, the micro-foundation of the enterprise weak links.
- Beer & Nohria2000Cracking the Code of Change (Theory E & Theory O)
Harvard Business Review 78(3): 133–141
The paradox change leaders must hold: economic value vs. organizational capability.
- Jay Barney1991Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage
Journal of Management 17(1): 99–120
Resource-based view underpinning Organizational Capacity for Change as a meta-capability.